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Markets, institutional change and the new agenda for 
agriculture 
 
 
Derek Eaton & Gerdien Meijerink 
 
1.  Introduction 
Recent discussion of the ‘new agenda for agriculture’ in development highlights a range of issues that 
deserve greater attention by policymakers and researchers. These include, among others, investing in 
technology to increase productivity, reforming trade and agricultural policies, providing access to 
services for the rural poor, and also attention for trends and risks with significant implications, such as 
HIV/AIDS and climate change. In particular, high-profile reports1 and initiatives (such as the 
‘Regoverning Markets’ project2) emphasise, in one form or another, the need to “create conditions that 
enable small-scale (resource-poor) farmers to participate in markets”. 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, a common theme in programmes and policies of bilateral and multilateral 
development organisations was that of ‘letting markets work’. Driven partly by structural adjustment 
programmes, this coincided with a broader political shift in many Western countries towards less 
government intervention in markets. As privatisation and liberalisation initiatives became more 
common in the 1990s, recognition grew that, particularly in developing and transition economies, 
markets don’t necessarily just develop on their own. Experiences in transition economies helped focus 
attention on ‘preconditions’ for the functioning of markets, such as property rights. Consequently 
various initiatives were launched to create an ‘enabling environment’ and achieve legal and regulatory 
changes e.g. by adopting Western legal systems. 
 
During the last decades, discussions on ‘enabling market conditions’ reflect a growing awareness of 
two issues. First, getting markets to work involves a much broader range of issues than simply 
removing (sometimes perverse) regulations and installing a legal system on paper. Second, even 
where markets expand, many people can be excluded from this process. How can this process 
therefore be directed to broaden, rather than limit, opportunities, particularly for the poor? 
 
Underlying the need to create ‘enabling market conditions’ are a number of basic questions for 
policymakers, researchers and those undertaking development initiatives, such as: 
• How can market opportunities for (small) farmers be improved? 
• How can market imperfections (for example, for credit) be overcome? 
• How can (small) farmers best organise themselves in markets (such as in producers’ 
associations and cooperatives)? 
This list is by no means exhaustive but all these questions are related to improving how markets work, 
both from efficiency and equity (fairness, or ‘pro-poor’) perspectives. This paper attempts to delve 
deeper into the ‘how’ questions related to how markets work and can be improved, which is often 
lacking in recent discussion. 
 
This chapter attempts to synthesise recent thinking and insights from research on the development of 
markets and markets institutions for agricultural development. Here, the concept market institutions 
refers to the broader range of factors that are necessary for the organisation of market exchange. The 
next section therefore summarises what is meant by markets and how the working of markets is 
conditioned by various levels of economic and social institutions. This ranges from the form that 
organisations, such as cooperatives and private companies, take to cultural norms and beliefs that 
help determine people’s behaviour. 
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The perspective here is consistent with that of many of the recent policy documents3 on the role of 
agriculture in development: market-driven development is central to reducing poverty and achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals. The focus on markets and institutions that support market exchange is 
not meant to undermine the importance of other key elements of promoting agricultural development, 
such as empowerment of the poor, improving the functioning of public organisations or dealing 
strategically with climate change. But given that market-driven development is seen as playing such a 
central role, there is a need to examine this process in a more detailed and systematic manner. 
 
The material and concepts reviewed are broad, though still limited in that they represent primarily an 
economic perspective4. Answering the practical ‘how’ questions listed above requires attention to two 
areas: 
(1)  More efforts are required to learn from existing and ongoing initiatives in 
agricultural development that attempt to stimulate these enabling market conditions. 
Both successes and failures provide a wealth of new understanding, which should be 
developed through stakeholder learning and action processes. 
(2) The emerging analytical framework5 needs to be further refined and expanded, in a 
way that maintains its practical relevance. As is emphasised in this chapter, very little 
is understood about how markets function, making it a challenging task to improve 
their functioning. 
 
These two areas are clearly complementary. The development of an analytical framework should learn 
from existing and ongoing successes and failures. As with any form of research activity, there is the 
risk of concentrating on theoretical issues and losing touch with reality. Or, there is also the risk that 
knowledge of specialised frameworks reduces the potential for broader reflection and learning (in itself 
becoming exclusive). On the other hand, a sufficient amount of intellectual and disciplinary rigour is 
required to answer the "how" questions and advance understanding of social processes beyond 
slogans. But the greatest risk of all perhaps is not finding a middle ground between theory and 
practical relevance, which could lead to far more ‘failures’ than necessary. 
 
2. Introducing markets and market institutions 
What are markets? Many people think of markets as physical places where goods are exchanged, 
ranging perhaps from local produce markets to modern stock exchanges. But, understanding the 
significance of markets means thinking about markets as an economic activity or a way of organizing 
exchange between people rather than about physical places. Thus a market can exist in various 
physical forms but refers primarily to the process by which a specific group of people exchange goods 
or services. In economic terms, markets are a mechanism for (re)allocating resources. The central 
activity in a market is the exchange, or transaction6. 
 
Discussion around supply/value chains is partly responsible for promoting an image of markets that 
emphasises a nice hierarchical image, such as can be seen in Figure 1. Very few markets in 
developing countries can be represented in such a simple manner. Markets, including those important 
for agriculture, such as markets for credit, labour, produce, have much more of a network-like 
structure (see Figure 2) where social relationships often determine who exchanges with whom and 
under which terms. Furthermore, there is typically far less specialisation of roles, meaning that 
individuals may buy or sell at various points in the hierarchy of the supply chain. 
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Figure 1: Example of a value/supply chain 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of market relationship dominated by networks and multiple roles 
 
 
 
In general, attention to markets has focused either on how markets can work more efficiently7, or on 
how to improve opportunities for poorer farmers to participate in markets, sometimes also termed 
market access. In particular, this addresses concerns about the obstacles facing small scale farmers 
to be integrated into markets that require ever higher safety and quality standards, as well as larger 
volumes, and that are increasingly organised through vertical coordination mechanisms. These trends 
are visible not only in export markets, but also in national markets in developing countries where 
supermarket chains, for example, are increasing market share although this is still a minor share of 
marketed agricultural produce8. 
 
A consideration of how markets work and can work better necessitates attention for the role that 
institutions and institutional change play in stimulating and supporting the working of markets and the 
development process. As a complex combination of organisational forms, formal rules, and informal 
norms and beliefs, institutions condition the choices and incentives that people face. In particular, 
institutions condition how people act in market situations, and thus affect how markets work. A market 
is itself a type of economic institution but how markets for different goods and services actually 
function in different circumstances is conditioned by a wide range of formal and informal institutions. 
 
An important message is that our understanding of the markets and market institutions is relatively 
modest, compared to the ambitions of interventions to promote equitable and sustainable agricultural 
development. In the discussion below, examples are used as much as possible. But in order to better 
illustrate the concepts and analytical frameworks, three example areas (input markets, output markets, 
and producer organisations) are examined in the final sections. 
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3. Understanding institutions 
“The statement that “institutions matter” does not make much sense unless we have a common 
understanding about what institutions are and how they are formed”9. 
 
So what are institutions? Institutions are basically invisible and usually taken for granted, resulting in the 
role of institutions being ignored for a long time, in policy and (economic) research. In this section, we 
will try to achieve a clearer understanding of what institutions are. This is challenging as the concept is 
rather abstract. 
 
The most common definition for institutions is from Douglass North10 who defined them as “formal and 
informal rules that shape human interaction”. North emphasises that a crucial distinction must be made 
between institutions and organisations. Although like institutions, organisations provide a structure to 
human interaction, conceptually rules (institutions) must be differentiated from the players 
(organisations). Using the analogy of a football game, the purpose of the rules is to define the way the 
game is played. But the objective of the players within that set of rules is to win the game, by a 
combination of skills, strategy, and coordination. In this light, the term institutional capacity building or 
development can be seen as strengthening the capacity of the players, but not as changing (e.g. 
improving) the rules. The purpose of institutional capacity development is to improve the “hardware” 
such as the construction of facilities or provision of equipment, and investing in the “software” 
including staff knowledge, skills, and attitudes11. In this section, we will focus more on the rules than 
the players. It must be noted, however, that organisations are also shaped by internal rules, especially 
when organisation are seen in a broader context, thus including production chains or community 
groups. 
 
The definition of North, although commonly used, is still very general. As North12 has stated institutions 
“are a guide to human interaction, so that when we wish to greet friends on the street, drive an 
automobile, buy oranges, borrow money, form a business, bury our dead, or whatever, we know (or 
can learn easily) how to perform these tasks”. Institutions thus are not only relevant to economic 
issues, but span a whole range of societal issues13. Within this broad definition, we will provide a 
specification of the types of institutions that exist, and which ones are relevant for our study on the 
role they play in economic development. 
 
A useful distinction between different levels of institutions was provided by Williamson14 as outlined in 
Figure 3. As seen in Figure 3, it is useful to distinguish between the institutional environment (or 
framework) and institutional arrangements15. The institutional environment consists of the set of 
constraints, both formal (e.g. laws) and informal (e.g. norms of social behaviour) that condition 
economic interaction, combining level 1 and 2 of Figure 3. The institutional environment usually applies 
within a country or a large region (such as a federal state). Some surpass national boundaries (such as 
the rules within the EU, or international agreements). 
 
Figure 3: Levels of institutions 
 
1 Informal rules: 
Customs, traditions, norms, beliefs, religion 
 
General 
2 Formal rules: 
Legislation and legal system (judiciary), political system, bureaucracy, 
regulations 
 
↓ 
 
3 Governance structures / institutional arrangements: 
Forms of organisations, contractual arrangements 
Specific 
Source: Adapted from Williamson, 200014 
 
Institutional arrangements, also referred to as organisations16 or governance structures14, comprise 
the groups of individuals bound by some common purpose. Common examples of economic bodies 
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that can be viewed as institutional arrangements are firms, family farms, and co-operatives, although 
organizations also include a wide range of political bodies, educational bodies, public bodies, etc. 
Again, the emphasis here is on the rules that constitute institutional arrangements, and not on their 
“hardware” and “software”. Three generic governance structures can be identified17 – communities, 
states, and markets – for the distinct ways that they coordinate joint activities and allocate claims on 
goods and services18. Often a mix (hybrid) of these governance structures exists in the production of a 
certain good. 
 
Institutions and development 
What does institutional change mean in the context of agricultural development? What is the 
relationship between institutional change and agricultural development? Today, it seems that there is 
no doubt concerning the importance of institutions in promoting economic development. This interest 
for institutions grew during the 1990s as both researchers and aid agencies devoted increasing 
attention to the role of governments in providing an “enabling environment” and good governance. 
Interest in thinking more systematically about what this implied was stimulated by the recognition 
generated for the work of the economic historian Douglass North, awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 1993. In 2002, the World Bank’s annual World Development Report was devoted to this 
theme emphasising the importance of institutions for “enhancing opportunities for poor people in 
markets, and empowering them. What makes market activity rewarding and possible for some, and 
not others? Why are some market systems inclusive and integrated, allowing benefits to flow to the 
poor as well as the rich, the rural people as well as the urban? And why are other markets localized 
and segmented?" Some development specialists even describe the development process as the “the 
complementary evolution of organisations and institutions”19. 
 
So how do institutions stimulate economic growth? Institutions affect the performance of the economy 
by their effect on the costs of exchange (transaction costs) and production. Together with the 
technology employed, they determine the transactions and transformations (production) that take 
place in an economy. Efficient institutions reduce these costs of exchange and production. Transaction 
costs consist essentially of all the resources, in particular the time of individuals, to search for, 
negotiate, conclude and enforce an agreement to exchange goods or services. High transaction costs 
(essentially for obtaining information) and risks lead to coordination problems and market failure, which 
further increases risks and the costs of exchange. Such an environment is highly unsupportive to 
technological change. Viewed in this way, the concepts and tools of new institutional economics can 
also explain the development and diffusion of technology in the agricultural sector. For example, 
Dorward et al.20 argue that the vicious circle of underdevelopment seen in many African countries is 
due to the high transaction costs and risks in markets for inputs, outputs and credit. These, in turn, 
arise from the sparse density of transactions as well as the current institutional arrangements. 
 
Why is it that certain technologies are developed by certain actors, and why are they used in some 
places but not in others for which they seem equally suited? These questions are even more interesting 
when the concept of technology is extended to include know-how concerning how to organise the 
production activities of individuals, for example within an estate, a cooperative or even a small family 
farm. To address such questions, it is necessary to examine the nature and role of institutions in 
economic activities (production, exchange, consumption). 
 
This is not to say that institutions are the sole determinants of agricultural development. Clearly, other 
factors, such as infrastructure and technology can help to reduce transaction costs too. However the 
development of technology or decision to improve infrastructure (including which infrastructure), is 
embedded within institutions and social systems in general. Institutions condition these processes and 
an understanding of this relationship is necessary for stimulating technological change. In the first 
instance, this requires more analytical insights into the functioning of institutions. It should be 
emphasised though that, at this point, more is understood about how the failure of institutions to adapt 
in certain directions constrains individuals in their attempts to improve their livelihoods. Much less is 
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known about how to steer or stimulate institutional change in certain directions. This issue is discussed 
further below. 
 
There are two types of purposes that institutions fulfil in economic terms21: 
• Promoting exchange 
• Protecting property and persons 
From an economic perspective, poorly functioning institutions mean that individuals and organisations 
perceive in many forms of investment a high risk that they will not be able to reap the rewards. For 
example, such risks are high when private property cannot be protected, or when difficulties in 
concluding and enforcing agreements with business partners or clients can only be overcome with 
resort to mechanisms such as ostracism or physical force. These risks decrease the incentive to 
invest in physical assets (including technology) or skills and knowledge. The result is that little 
innovation, whether in terms of technology or in terms of new ways of organizing production or 
distribution, takes place and productivity does not increase. 
 
The principal three categories of interest here, informal rules, formal rules, and organisations (see 
table 1) can be considered in terms of the role they play in either promoting exchange or protecting 
property (or both). 
 
Levels of institutions Institutions to promote 
exchange 
Institutions to protect 
property and persons 
Institutional Environment: 
Embeddedness 
Informal rules 
Norms 
Beliefs 
Shared values 
Perceived legitimacy of laws 
Religious-based norms 
Traditional customs 
Institutional Environment: 
Formal rules 
Contracts and contract 
enforcement mechanisms (legal 
system) 
Commercial rules 
Constitutions 
Laws 
Institutional Arrangements*: 
Governance structures 
Organizations 
Firms  ------------ 
Co-operatives ------------ 
Coordination 
(vertical supply arrangements) 
Contracts 
----> 
----> 
Table 1: Categories and examples of institutions supporting economic growth 
Note * Organisations involved in coordinating production processes serve both purposes of promoting exchange and 
protecting property. 
 
Organization and governance 
The third level of institutional arrangements is a logical place to start given that it includes what most 
people think of as “institutions”. Institutional arrangements include organizations and other 
organizational forms, or governance structures. In essence, this refers to the agreements among 
people as to how to conduct some activity. For example, a firm is an organization that produces a 
good or service and sells it to clients. Explaining the economic logic for the existence of firms, as 
opposed to a series of (short-term) contracts or agreements between individuals, has been a central 
question in new institutional economics. Other forms of organization include non-profit organizations, 
co-operatives and public agencies, including government ministries. 
 
In addition to these types of organizations, institutional arrangements also refer to different forms of 
agreements, or contracts that govern transactions. This includes for example the forms and terms of 
contractual arrangements in vertically coordinated supply chains. Contract farming, though still 
occupying a relatively small share, is a fast-growing arrangement by which supermarkets and their 
suppliers source produce, especially from developing countries. For some commodities, there is also 
a growing tendency to contract from larger farms (estates) or groups of farmers. This is driven by 
efficiency benefits captured by actors further down the supply chain but also leads to a restructuring 
of production at farm level. Some farmers may benefit and others may lose. Box 1 illustrates how 
some of those losses may be partly offset by benefits from expanding overall production. 
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Specific institutional arrangements serve primarily to promote more efficient exchange of goods and 
services. For instance, a business with a number of employees has the advantage that it saves on 
transaction costs for the owner or manager who does not need to repeatedly negotiate contracts 
(agreements) with employees for their labour skills. Similarly, the use of contract farming may reduce 
costs for both farmers and purchasers in finding and securing produce, relative to using the “spot” 
market. Most importantly such arrangements help reduce uncertainty, which is also included as an 
element of transaction costs. 
 
In general, organisational forms emerge to support exchange, specialisation and more complex 
production technologies. In particular, as the private firm grows beyond the size of 1-2 persons, it 
internalises the costs of organising the myriad of transactions necessary for the production of some 
good in a type of command-and-control hierarchy. This does not mean that economic development 
necessarily leads to a non-stop process favouring larger industrial conglomerates. The optimal 
economic size of a firm may decrease as well as increase, given changes in technology, knowledge, 
market structure and other factors22. But even relatively small firms do emerge based on economic 
opportunities as well as supporting aspects of the institutional environment. Businesses can only 
operate successful though when agreements on performance, delivery of services (delegation of 
tasks) and payments within that business can be sufficiently enforced by management. 
 
 
Box 1: Illustration from Senegalese vegetable exports 
The effects of changing institutional arrangements on inclusion or exclusion of smallholders are complicated, as 
illustrated by recent survey work among Senegalese horticultural producers23. Restructuring of the supply chain 
benefits some farmers and decreases opportunities for others, but the indirect effects may be less clear. 
 
Exports of French beans from Senegal have almost doubled in the past decade, despite increasingly stringent 
quality standards in the importing European market. This growth has involved institutional change consisting of 
a shift from the use of contract farming to production on larger estates. Only larger, better-resourced farmers 
have generally continued with contract farming, as they are able to meet demands for larger orders and higher 
quality. Others have shifted to become farm workers on the new estates. Contract farming households have 
higher incomes than those of estate farm workers. But the latter households have considerably higher incomes 
than those not participating in the value chain at all (see Figure 4). 
 
Thus, some farmers, previously contracted for bean cultivation, have been excluded from participation in the 
market in this manner. This exclusion has been driven by increasing demands in foreign markets for stricter 
quality standards. But many of these farmers have replaced this lost opportunity with income from working on 
estates. Furthermore, the overall growth in exports, partly attributable to higher scale of production, has enabled 
even more workers to be hired, leading to overall income gains in the region. A survey in 2005 in Les Niayes, 
where more than 90% of exported French beans are grown, estimated that the share of households engaged in 
contract farming decreased from 23% to 10% between 2000 and 2005, while the proportion of households with 
members engaged in employment on estates increased from 10% to 34%. 
 
What has not been explored in this type of 
research though, is whether there were other 
possibilities for institutional initiatives that could 
have further improved the position of small 
farmers, or mitigate any negative repercussions. 
Are there, for example, possibilities for 
producers’ associations to achieve some of the 
same types of gains as estates, in terms of quality 
control and larger volumes? 
 
Figure 4: Household income by source (survey of 
Senegalese farmers in French bean producing 
region) Source: (Maertens and Swinnen 2007) 
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In many areas of local trade and even manufacturing in Sub-Saharan African countries, businesses of 
more than one person are still rather scarce24. Entrepreneurs and managers of small businesses in 
Africa contend with problems of internal enforcement of agreements and delegation of tasks among 
employees. Partly for these reasons, markets25 play a relatively large role in places like Sub-Saharan 
Africa in allocating resources, given the relative lack of medium to larger size business firms. These 
markets are characterised thus not only by the large number of very small ‘firms’, including individual 
entrepreneurs, but also by an important role for networks and social relationships. From an economic 
point of view, these networks are used to reduce the costs of acquiring information about one’s 
trading partner, which are termed search costs (also a form of transaction costs). Networks, including 
those based on ethnic, family and religious ties, play an important economic role. Individuals form 
networks in order to reduce transaction costs. Part of the challenge of development includes the 
evolution of institutions to support more impersonal exchange. Research suggests that almost 
exclusive reliance on networks considerably raises the costs of exchange compared to a situation in 
which institutions have developed that promote interactions and transactions that are less based on 
personal relationships24. Box 2 describes an interesting example of grain traders in many African 
countries where seemingly obvious efficiencies from larger-scale operations are not captured, with the 
market dominated often by almost one-man operations. 
 
 
Box 2: Illustration from African grain traders 
Production and trade in Sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by small-scale producers. Grain traders, for example, 
are often at most one-person businesses. Produce is not very standardised (diverse local varieties) and variation 
in quality is wide. These entrepreneurs therefore devote a considerable amount of time to inspecting each 
purchase. 
 
Figure 5, based on survey work in three countries, indicates 
that inspection of grain quality is almost entirely done by the 
trader, who is not confident in delegating this task to an 
employee or to relying on assessment by others (such as 
grading organisations). This process is clearly quite time 
consuming, particularly since traders need to travel 
themselves to points of purchase. These transaction costs are 
a burden on the entire economy (including consumers of 
grain) that can only be reduced through the development of 
both formal and informal institutions. 
 
Figure 5: Assessment of quality by grain traders26 
 
 
Formal Rules 
Formal rules refer to laws, regulations or other forms of codified (explicit) prescriptions as to what 
individuals or organisations may or may not do. There are different formal rules with different 
functions. But basically, from an economic point of view, formal rules promote exchange by (i) 
supporting exchange, i.e. the negotiation of agreements, or contracts between agents and (ii) in 
protecting property and persons. The set of formal rules is sometimes also referred to as the 
institutional environment. Economic growth through the growth of specialisation and exchange in an 
economy depends on the evolution of the institutional environment27. 
 
When the institutional environment does not sufficiently support the protection of property and 
impersonal exchange, the economic system becomes a local barter in economies where goods and 
services are exchanged primarily through face-to-face transactions between individuals who are related 
through some form of family, religious, ethnic bonds. In such an economy, informal rules and social 
institutions play a major role (and are discussed further below). 
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Supporting exchange 
A major challenge to promoting exchange is the development of formal and informal rules that allow 
yet greater gains from trade (and specialisation) to be realised through exchange between people who 
are not only strangers to each other, but also to each other’s networks. Why this is important is 
illustrated in Box 3. Being able to deal only with those with whom a (long-standing) relationship has 
been established and enforcing agreements through personal ties involves high costs in terms of time 
that could have been spent more productively. In addition, it limits the number of trading partners, thus 
limiting the extent of trade and profits. 
 
Contractual safeguards help to support the process of impersonal exchange. These can include formal 
rules, such as written contracts, disclosure agreements and contract enforcement through courts or 
arbiters, but informal rules, such as codes of conduct among merchants and other basis for trust and 
co-operation, continue to play a role (see next section), even when formal rules are in place. 
 
As institutions increase the certainty that agreements or contracts will be respected, individual agents 
will be more willing to invest and undertake more complex transactions. This includes acquiring and 
sharing knowledge about production processes, which is increasingly necessary if people are to 
specialise. Not only are they more willing to transact, but they are able to transact more because the 
costs (particularly in terms of time) of acquiring information about their exchanging partner and 
enforcing contracts (also in terms of time spent on e.g. visiting the defaulter or legal procedures) are 
reduced. 
 
 
Box 3: Exchange when formal rules are lacking: the example of agricultural traders in Madagascar, Benin and Malawi 
Agricultural traders in Madagascar, Benin and Malawi face various breaches of contract as well as theft of their 
produce. At the first glance these instances seem to be quite low, but a closer look shows that the traders have 
implemented various strategies to lower the risk that these contract breaches happen. These strategies usually do 
not make use of formal rules and institutions because they do not exist, are unreliable or involve very high 
transaction costs (long administrative procedures and waiting time). The strategies that agricultural traders 
implement are effective but entail high transaction costs that are often overlooked. 
 
Theft is avoided by sleeping in the stores or by not stocking the goods at all. Transport of goods involves high 
risks which are reduced by paying protection money or travelling in convoy. 
 
Contract breaches are avoided by adopting strategies that leave little room for abuse. Most transactions are 
executed through cash-and-carry, exchanging goods for money on the spot, without supplier credit, placement of 
orders, paying by check or invoice. Although this reduces contractual risk, they complicate the transactions and 
planning of business. Goods are inspected by the traders themselves, because there is a high quality risk. This 
procedure complicates the conduct of business and requires extensive travel for the trader. 
 
When there are conflicts about non-payment or late delivery of goods, these are usually resolved by direct 
negotiation between the conflicting parties. In order to resolve these conflicts, the strength of the relationship is 
an important factor. Only when conflicts are severe, traders turn to formal rules and institutions such as the 
police and courts. However, this also often leads to the discontinuance of the relationship and therefore traders 
will try to avoid such conflicts. Losing a trading partner means losing trade and losing the long-term investment 
in establishing the relationship. Resolving conflicts can take a lot of time, involving frequent visits to the other 
party, waiting time, time spent on discussions, costs of settling the dispute (e.g. reaching a compromise that 
involves splitting costs or even accepting non-payment). 
 
Source: (Fafchamps 2004)28 
 
 
Protecting property 
In addition to supporting exchange, formal rules are also an important means for protecting property 
and persons. People are less willing to invest in productive activities if there is considerable risk that 
their assets might be forcefully appropriated. Similarly the incentive to engage in exchange, even for 
example to bring one’s good to the market, depends on assurances that one’s goods cannot be 
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expropriated. Thus property rights play a central role in economic development. What are property 
rights? They can be defined as socially sanctioned uses of valuable assets by economic actors29. This 
can refer to defining access, use and transfer of physical property, such as land, as well as more 
intangible property, such as knowledge and technology. Property rights are essential to determining a 
market situation, in terms of defining the buyers and sellers, the good (or service) being exchanged, 
the nature of payment and the means for resolving disputes. 
 
Why are property rights important for economic activity? The manner in which property rights are 
structured has important implications for both the efficient organisation of economic activity, but also 
for the distribution of wealth and power in society. In terms of efficiency, the structure of property 
rights systems determines to what extent incentives facing private actors (individuals, firms) take into 
account unintended positive or negative effects on other actors30. But property rights also have to be 
defined and enforceable in order to be effective in the first place. In terms of equity, property rights 
define who owns what, who has decision-making power and thus who receives the benefits arising 
from the use of resources. Property rights are thus an issue of fundamental political and economic 
importance. They are basic social institutions that determine incentives for investment, production and 
exchange31. Property rights are also important for sustainable use of natural resources. When 
exclusive property rights, whether held collectively or individually, are defined insufficiently over a 
certain resource, then a resulting open access situation can lead to excessive use of that resource 
(e.g. open access fisheries lead to depletion of fish stocks). But, as will be seen below, knowledge of 
exactly how property rights are assured in different social and political settings is limited. 
 
Efficient markets, well-defined property rights and effective, well-intentioned states are seen as critical 
ingredients of “good governance” which lies basically in the hands of national policy-makers. This view 
focuses on the state as being the sole governance structure and this view leaves very little scope for 
intervention. It relegates “good governance” to the realm of “necessary prerequisites” for economic 
development or technology adoption and in that sense precludes any scope for intervention or 
improvement. However, institutional analysis goes beyond “good governance” as defining it as merely 
a political problem, and examines the mechanisms that underlie various processes, leading to either 
successful outcomes (e.g. economic development, reducing poverty and inequality), or to stagnation 
or even deterioration. It is not just a question of the existence of institutions or a lack of them, but also 
of what type. Not all institutions lead to successful outcomes, as is sometimes assumed when lack of 
economic development is attributed to a lack of institutions. Perverse or inappropriate institutions also 
exist. 
 
Informal Rules and Norms 
Informal rules and norms are even more elusive than formal ones, as they are not written down, and 
are often hard to observe or almost invisible. They have certainly not played a role in most economic 
analyses because of this. However, they can have a decisive role in determining the success or failure 
of economic enterprises, such as markets. Informal rules are all the implicit rules, customs, norms, 
practices, and habits that are more or less followed by a certain group or society. Simply put, it is a 
“way of doing things”. Often “social capital” is seen to mean the same as informal rules. Social capital 
refers to “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action”32. However, social capital does not always 
contribute to improved efficiency of society, as organised crime for instance can also be characterised 
by a high degree of social capital. Sometimes these informal rules are called “social institutions”33. 
 
Informal rules as well as social capital play a role because in general, they lower transaction costs. 
Knowing and trusting people, knowing the “way things are done” and trusting the fact that everyone will 
abide by this mode of operation makes it easier in terms of time and costs to exchange information, 
make and stick to agreements. But informal rules may also contribute to the effectiveness of formal 
rules. If the norm is to abide by formal rules e.g. you always stop before a red traffic light, regardless 
of whether the police is checking you, then it is less costly to enforce these formal rules. If this is not 
the case, e.g. everyone drives through the red light, then either the formal rule becomes a “paper 
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tiger” or a substantial amount of resources needs to be spent to enforce this rule – e.g. monitor 
driving behaviour and fine anyone who drives through red. See box 4 for the Grameen bank as an 
example of how informal rules can function as an enforcement mechanism. 
 
The bonds between people engaged in exchange are also determined by informal rules or social 
institutions and serve to enforce the terms of the exchange. Trading with more distant partners is 
based initially on norms and networks that allow traders to contact and gather information about their 
exchanging partner. These networks and their norms then serve to help enforce the exchange terms 
agreed upon, and may be based on social or religious ties, or common language, for example. Such 
practices are widespread even in more industrialised countries, because of how they help reduce 
transaction costs. 
 
Here the role of behaviour and reputation of those engaged in exchange becomes important too34. 
When most stick to the rules, it becomes easier for others to also abide by the rules. A virtuous circle 
of reputation (for sticking to the rules), trust, reciprocity (others also stick to the rules) and cooperation 
develops. This can be associated with the notion of social capital. Social capital as defined by the 
World Bank refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a 
society's social interactions. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a 
society – it is the glue that holds them together. Box 4 gives an example of how enforcement 
problems with relation to financial services to the poor were solved by building on reputation and social 
capital within groups. 
 
The reverse may also be true. A situation where not all players abide by the rules, but often “cheat”, 
may lead to a vicious circle of reputation (for cheating), mistrust, reciprocity (others also cheat) and no 
cooperation. In this case, this will undermine the institutional arrangement, and (outside) enforcement 
becomes even more necessary. “Cheating” can become an institution in itself, for instance some form 
of corruption as a custom or norm. 
 
 
Box 4: Informal rules as enforcement mechanism: the Grameen Bank 
Mohammed Yunus was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for what is essentially an institutional innovation. 
He set up the Grameen Bank which provides credit to the poorest of the poor in rural Bangladesh without any 
collateral. By doing this, he ran the risk of financial bankruptcy, because by not demanding any collateral, how 
could he make sure that loans were repaid? The interest rates of moneylenders are often very high because the 
defaulting rate is high as well. By demanding a high interest rate, they can recover some of their losses. But 
Yunus also asked low interest rates. Somehow he had to solve the problem of defaulting and enforcement of 
payments. He did this by relying mostly on informal rules and social capital of groups. 
 
There were two critical factors to the success of the Grameen Bank. First, was to lend money mostly to women, 
because Yunus found that women usually invest productively to support their families. Secondly, he gave loans 
to groups. The system is explained in the “credit delivery system” of the Grameen bank: “Groups of five 
prospective borrowers are formed; in the first stage, only two of them are eligible for, and receive, a loan. The 
group is observed for a month to see if the members are conforming to the rules of the bank. Only if the first 
two borrowers begin to repay the principal plus interest over a period of six weeks, do the other members of the 
group become eligible themselves for a loan. Because of these restrictions, there is substantial group pressure to 
keep individual records clear. In this sense, the collective responsibility of the group serves as the collateral on 
the loan.” In the method of action the Grameen bank further explains that “Lean on solidarity groups: small 
informal groups consisting of co-opted members coming from the same background and trusting each other.” 
 
This model became a great success and by 2003, over 300 million US$ had been loaned to half a million of 
groups. The fact that Yunus received the Nobel prize for this reflects the fact how innovative his institutional 
solution was.  
 
Source: The Grameen Bank (http://www.grameen-info.org/)  
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In discussing informal institutions in the form of belief and social norms, it is important to avoid the 
simplistic “modernising” perspective that views such institutions as holding back economic change. 
Hayami and Kikuchi35 studied the recent development of vegetable marketing chains in an area of West 
Java, Indonesia. They concluded that traditional norms and values concerning reciprocity and honour in 
local communities supported the emergence of efficient forms of contracting among producers and 
traders, requiring fewer use of formal institutions for enforcing contracts. Hayami and Kikuchi argue 
that this demonstrates how “traditional” institutions, in this case social norms of behaviour, do not have 
to be an impediment to efficient exchange, and can actually promote it. They point out that similar 
examples can be found in the history of Japanese industrialisation. 
 
In discussing the role of informal institutions, a qualification is needed. Although it is true that informal 
rules play a crucial role in reducing the risks linked to exchange (e.g. contract breaches), especially 
when formal rules are missing or not reliable, there is a danger in overemphasising their potential to 
support efficient exchange. Informal rules may also involve high transaction costs when based on 
personal relationships which require considerable investments for their establishment and 
maintenance. Investment in such relationships does reduce transaction costs and risks associated with 
exchange. But exchange based purely on personal relationships is likely to be limited in volume and in 
terms of the number of trading partners. It becomes clear when we imagine how we, living in a 
developed country, would go about out doing our regular day-to-day business such as buying 
groceries, buying books via the internet, accessing our money from an ATM machine, when we needed 
to have long-standing personal relationships with all the people we dealt with on an impersonal basis 
every day! On the other hand, informal rules, norms, personal relationships are never completely 
replaced and also continue to play a role in situations where formal rules are effective. 
 
There is no magic combination of formal and informal institutions. The growth and development of 
markets can take place under various combinations of formal and informal institutions that promote 
exchange and protect property36. A relevant modern example is the rapid economic growth that has 
taken place in China during the last decade and a half. This appears to have been possible with a 
relative lack of enforcement of private property rights, at least from a Western legal perspective, 
particularly with respect to land. One can point perhaps to other institutional arrangements and norms 
which have contributed to protecting property (and investments) in China. Or some argue that it is 
possible that ongoing growth is only possible if such institutions and others (e.g. banks and the credit 
market) are reformed. But the point remains that considerable economic expansion has occurred 
without following a prescription or universal recipe for institutional reform. How this has taken place or 
could be further supported by institutional change has not been sufficiently examined. 
 
4. Institutional change and agricultural development: How do institutions change? 
It is important to recognise that institutions are in a constant state of evolution. The pace of this 
change may be admittedly slow in many instances, and certain institutional configurations might 
become ‘locked-in’ for long periods of time. Institutions are established and changed by groups of 
people who act within their social environment, based on past experience (learning). As North stated: 
“Organisations and their entrepreneurs engage in purposive activity and in that role are the agents of, 
and shape the direction of, institutional change”37. Or: “Institutions are the product of intentional human 
efforts to give structure to an uncertain world, and are congruent with a society’s dominant belief 
system on how the world operates. Enduring changes in institutions only occur when this underlying 
belief system also changes” (Shirley38 paraphrasing North39. This is not meant to imply that beliefs 
drive institutional change. But certain beliefs and cultural attitudes permit a learning process that 
supports, in turn, a change in beliefs as institutions change. Dolfsma40 has therefore described rules 
as ‘solidified’ or consolidated learning. There is thus a clear link between institutional change and 
learning, which opens up possibilities of institutional change through learning processes. 
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The fact that institutions are embedded in social environments has some important consequences. The 
relative importance of various social networks in promoting exchange and reducing transaction costs 
was highlighted above. But social networks may serve also to prevent new competitors from gaining a 
foothold in markets and thus inhibit institutional change. This kind of entry restriction is probably most 
serious in the types of products and markets that are relatively stable over time, such as those 
dominated by primary commodities, in contrast to those characterised by more frequent innovation 
and changes. Furthermore, little is known about how these networks evolve over time41, which may be 
key to understanding how to create opportunities for others, especially excluded groups. Networks are 
not formal organizations, which makes it difficult to consider how their membership can be influenced. 
 
In a relatively static economy, the differentiation (segmentation) of groups among different economic 
activities can become entrenched for simple economic reasons. “For instance, if there are many 
Luos42 in fish trade, Luos who wish to start their own business are more likely to enter fish trade than 
any other trade, simply because they are more likely to already have contacts with fish traders”41. This 
obviously has negative implications for the equality of opportunity and possible inclusion of certain 
groups. 
 
Segmentation can therefore also have negative effects on investment choices by biasing the choices 
of entrepreneurs and individuals away from potentially more profitable opportunities (leading to 
efficiency losses over time). Others may be excluded or hindered from engaging in risky but potentially 
promising new lines of activity. The result is an economy in which various networks and groups serve 
to replicate themselves and the status quo. The process of economic development thus includes a 
certain amount of evolution and change among such networks and the associated segmentation of 
activities. 
 
These networks also vary across countries. Fafchamps43 explains how networks of agricultural traders 
(grain traders) in Malawi and Madagascar are relatively thin, for example. This means that traders know 
and deal on average with a limited number of suppliers (farmers or other traders) and clients 
(wholesalers or retailers). Making new business contacts is costly in terms of time necessary to 
develop a relationship involving sufficient trust. On the other hand, surveys in both Kenya and Benin 
indicate that business networks of grain traders are denser. This means that information circulates 
more freely and thus results in more efficient transactions (e.g. requiring less time). 
 
Institutional dynamics can be studied43. Researchers in this area though are concentrating first and 
foremost on improving understanding of the forces at work. It will be some time before there are clear 
policy prescriptions44. 
 
How can institutional change be stimulated? 
If institutions are so important, then it might be argued that more ODA funds should be devoted to 
improving institutions, relative to investments in technology or infrastructure. Added to this argument 
may be the justification that institutions have been relatively neglected in the past. The issue is not so 
simple though. First of all, when technology has many public good characteristics, such as in the 
agricultural sector, there remains a strong argument to continue government support, although careful 
examination of the specific forms of technology development sponsored by public, possibly foreign 
funds, such as ODA is warranted. Secondly, improving institutions is more easily prescribed than 
achieved. 
 
Despite recognition of the importance of institutions, much thinking about promoting development (e.g. 
the IAC report45) seems to imply that institutional development is simply something ‘to be done’ (for 
example, through capacity development or good governance initiatives), or a question of political will. 
Yet, the experiences of trying to promote institutional development make a strong case that our 
understanding of the processes is still insufficient46. As Löffler et al.47 have observed in an analysis of 
twelve recent development policy reports, there seems to be consensus on what needs to be done. 
For instance, (financial) services to the poor should be improved, market access for (poor) farmers 
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should be enhanced, safety nets for the poor should be in place, to mention just a few But there is still 
very little experience with and guidance on how to achieve institutional change that goes beyond 
developing new policies and laws that remain paper tigers. How can changes to formal institutions 
become effective and embedded in society and behaviour? How can informal rules and norms or social 
capital be developed, improved, strengthened? The question on how to achieve this kind of institutional 
change is therefore still unanswered to a large extent. This is a reflection of how complex the process 
is. 
 
How can researchers and practitioners help to address the how question? While this is a new area, still 
requiring considerable methodological development, the general shape of a research agenda has been 
emerging in recent years. This combines elements of various social sciences, in particular economics 
and sociology, and involves using both case studies and theory to improve our understanding of how 
institutions appear, persist and/or evolve. This research is largely academic in nature and thus a 
remaining priority is to see how this research can build on and also assist organisations seeking to 
promote institutional and overall socio-economic development. 
 
Tripp48 emphasises that both scholars and the development community are “still a long way from being 
able to explain how and why change takes place”. Our ability to predict the direction or identify the 
causal relationships is limited. And it probably always will be limited, given the difficulties in 
generalising about institutional change across quite different circumstances49. Limited does not mean 
though that progress is not possible and indeed this is one of the most rapidly developing areas of 
social theory today. 
 
One of the issues in how to achieve institutional change is whether rules and governance structures 
that are successful in one situation (or country) can be imitated to apply in another situation (or 
country)? Figure 1 partly answers this question. An institution at a lower level should fit within the 
institutions of a higher level. Thus institutional arrangements should fit within the institutional 
environment. But institutional environments should fit within the social norms etc. If the match is not 
there, then the organizational arrangements and formal rules may be ignored or ineffective, or lead to 
other, not necessarily intended consequences. 
 
The experience of many Latin American countries, who modelled their constitutions after independence 
in the early nineteenth century on the U.S. example, indicates that establishing formal rules in the form 
of a constitution is not sufficient to stimulate institutional change. These formal rules need to be 
embedded in supportive norms. And the history taken by the evolution of power and the accumulation 
of economic assets also conditions what is possible. 
 
More concretely, the World Bank devoted considerable resources to judicial reform projects in the 
1990s50. Such initiatives concentrate on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the court system 
(including lawyers). For example, this may involve the training of judges and reforming laws, particularly 
those prescribing the rights and jurisdiction of courts, the government and the legislature. A review 
highlighted though that little was known about what makes such an initiative successful. Indeed, it was 
also found that initiatives should “try to bolster or complement informal enforcement mechanisms”, as 
well as the targeted formal system50. Studies of how parties enforce “contracts”51 in Africa find that 
the legal system is of secondary importance next to the use of relationships and reputation52. The 
example given in Box 4 on micro-credit illustrates the importance of relationships and reputation as 
enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Thus developing an institution, creating a new one, or transferring an institution from one situation to 
another all should answer the question of whether this is possible. An institution can only be successful 
if it is respected or can be enforced. Writing up new rules (e.g. laws) is relatively simple – but if this 
new rule is not applied, respected or enforced, it is not effective, and one may argue that this does not 
equal an institution. Key questions are then why formal rules are not enforced, and related, how could 
they become enforceable? 
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Although the issues involved in institutional change are complex, there is scope for adapting 
institutions from one place and transferring them to another place52. Institutional innovations do occur 
and are copied by economic actors. When this is done by external actors, such as development 
organizations, it may be difficult to predict how the new arrangements will function within a different 
environment, in particular a rather different set of informal norms and beliefs (i.e. culture). A major task 
for research that can guide policy is to better understand this process. 
 
We have seen that a major emphasis in the development of institutions, particularly those to promote 
exchange, concerns the emergence of informal norms and beliefs that encourage exchange between 
strangers53. This process can be illustrated with the example of the development of markets for 
providing farmers with a greater choice and quality of seed. Seed is a good that presents many 
difficulties for efficient transacting. Farmers can know very little about the quality, performance and 
general characteristics of seed when they purchase it. These aspects will only become known after 
planting and even harvesting, at which point the seller of the seed can easily be long gone. Thus the 
development of seed markets has been based partly on growth of reputation and trust among seed 
providers and farmers. Using this example of seed markets, Tripp suggests that “development 
programmes need to identify cases where the process has begun and to build upon such “islands of 
trust” that can serve as examples for the wider economy”54. 
 
The importance of networks has been discussed above. While little is known about how social 
networks come into existence or evolve, development initiatives have often been successful in bringing 
groups together and promoting contacts that otherwise would not have occurred. In some sense, this 
ability to foster new networks may offer some opportunities for promoting institutional change54. 
 
The link between learning and institutional change has already been touched upon briefly. Learning can 
lead to institutional change when groups reflect on how current formal and informal institutions affect 
certain goals or problems, conflicts and social dilemmas and how change in formal and informal 
institutions can lead to an improved situation. Such learning processes are continuously ongoing in 
societies. The issue here is how these can be actively stimulated and facilitated. 
 
Several approaches have been developed in the past. For instance several joint learning processes 
such as farmer field schools have been used for improving agricultural production and technology55. 
Multi-stakeholder platforms are an approach to facilitate social learning. Woodhill56 argues that social 
learning is more than learning in a group setting: “it involves understanding the limitations of existing 
institutions and mechanisms of governance and experimenting with multi-layered, learning-oriented and 
participatory forms of governance”. Thus multistakeholder processes can be considered as the 
“practical application of a social learning ‘philosophy’ to a specific situation”57. A key ingredient in 
multistakeholder platforms is the development of the capacity for learning and innovation through a 
“high level of facilitation skills and enlightened leadership from within stakeholder groups”, which links 
up the area of capacity development with institutional change. 
 
Linked to this is the recent interest among development assistance organizations for supporting the 
institutional development that contributes to poverty reduction has centred on a number of strategies 
for empowering the poor. Empowerment is seen as a means for the poor to improve their ability to 
organise and lobby for a larger share of resources (public or private), but also to tilt the evolution of 
rules (e.g. property rights regimes) more in their favour. For example, the 2001 Poverty Report of 
IFAD58 identifies three approaches by which development assistance and interventions can contribute 
to empowering the poor: 
 
• blend of devolution and collective action for natural resources management 
• delivery of financial services to the poor to improve their access to credit 
• developing linkages with NGOs and private sector as partners for service delivery 
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Thus, in terms of the framework developed here, empowerment initiatives attempt to support poorer 
individuals to establish and exercise basic rights over themselves (protecting persons). Such initiatives 
are also intended to improve the bargaining position of the poor relative to non-poor in the ongoing 
processes by which the formal, and also informal, rules are maintained or (hopefully) changed. 
 
But such initiatives may not necessarily lead to their intended empowerment effect. For example, 
through the devolution of authority, decisions concerning public service delivery may be allocated to 
local government authorities that might be more accessible to poorer farmers. But there may also be 
the risk that local elites have greater chance to appropriate resources for their own benefit. Another 
example concerns property rights to land; poor farmers may be excluded either intentionally or 
coincidentally in such a titling scheme. These illustrations highlight the need to look not only at rules 
but also the constellation of access to resources and relationships between different groups. 
 
5. Key examples of institutional arrangements embedded in institutional 
environment 
This section briefly discusses two areas that illustrate the role played by formal and informal 
institutions in agricultural development: markets for seed (a key input in agricultural production) and 
agricultural product markets (output markets). Both provide examples of how improved economic 
opportunities are related to changes in institutions to promote exchange and/or to protect property. 
 
Input market: seed 
The Green Revolution provides an example of how technology and institutions interacted in economic 
change. Many accounts of the successes and (geographical) limits of the introduction of modern high-
yielding varieties (HYVs) concentrate on the suitability of these varieties for relatively controlled 
production environments (achieved with irrigation and the application of fertilisers and pesticides). 
Where agro-ecosystems are more diverse, or marginal, such varieties are less appropriate and hence 
the need for alternative breeding strategies or technologies less dependent on the provision of 
improved germplasm and more on cropping and farm management practices in terms of natural 
resource management59. This approach runs the risk of overlooking the complementary role and 
evolution of institutional arrangements in the adoption of HYVs, which has recently been highlighted by 
Dorward et al60. 
 
Seed provision is one of the best examples for examining the agricultural development process61. The 
supply of seed to farmers can be undertaken and managed by farmers, commercial firms or state 
agencies. Farmers select, develop and maintain varieties since cultivation began. Only more recently 
have commercial enterprises engaged in seed production and breeding for major staple crops in 
developing countries. In addition, governments have played a significant role in this process including 
both supplying seed and regulating this process (e.g. through certification of seed and licensing of 
producers) when undertaken by other actors. The seed sector has thus also been the subject of 
numerous donor initiatives. In general, the commercialization of seed production has been a defining 
characteristic of productivity improvements in agriculture. Much of these improvements can be thought 
of as comprising the adoption of new technologies, as new varieties often come ‘bundled’ together in a 
technology package (with the Green Revolution’s HYVs representing the strongest example). 
 
Thus seed provision provides a useful means of examining the course of agricultural development. This 
goes beyond an understanding of the basic economics of changing production systems to also include 
insights into the changing nature of formal and informal institutions in agriculture. 
The development of commercial seed markets depends on the formal and informal rules, norms and 
beliefs that improve the flow of information concerning seed and its providers, and thus promote 
exchange. Tripp61 proposes that three different kinds of information are important in seed provision: 
technical information, economic information and reputations. Farmers are often lacking information 
about the specific attributes of varieties, including both traditional and modern varieties. In many 
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circumstances, plant breeders in the public and private sectors do not have enough access to the 
technical requirements of farmers. Economic information refers to the knowledge of prices, quantities 
and movements in both input and output markets. Reputations of those selling seed or producing seed 
on contract are also a form of information that is particularly important in the development of seed 
provision systems involving exchange. Price and credit issues aside, farmers will understandably only 
purchase seed on the basis that the risk of dishonest sellers and poor quality is low. Eventually, 
certification organizations, such as those often established by the government, can help reduce this 
risk. But the principal means of assessing the reliability of information received about varieties being 
sold is reputation and trust that may be established only over the course of time. 
 
The development of seed provision systems can thus be seen as a process by which the availability of 
information improves for various actors. This occurs through changes in various adaptations in 
informal and formal rules, norms and beliefs. Informal norms concerning the purchase of seed may 
evolve to add commercial agents (often with representatives from the local community) to the list of 
potentially trustworthy sources of seed. Formal rules concerning the regulation and certification of the 
agronomic qualities of modern varieties may be instituted to also increase the trustworthiness of 
information provided by commercial seed providers themselves. 
 
So while there may be apparently obvious technological opportunities for the adoption of new varieties, 
constraints can equally exist in the economic institutions. Where these relate to formal rules, solutions 
involving legislation and government initiatives help. But overcoming constraints based more on 
informal institutional arrangements presents more challenges. In particular, the issue of trust and 
reputation in seed production and sale is seen as a stumbling block in many situations61. 
 
Output market (supply/value chain arrangements) 
The organisation of output markets provides another useful example for illustrating the important role 
played by the development of institutions in the growth of the agricultural sector. The previous 
example looked at one of the most important inputs – seeds – while the discussion here concentrates 
on the next step in the supply chain: sale of harvested products. Currently, there is much discussion 
and research concerning trends in vertical coordination and integration in agricultural supply chains, 
with particular interest in the issue of bargaining power and dependency between various actors. But it 
is instructive to place that within a framework that explains the emergence and growth of markets for 
farm products (or the failure of such a process). 
 
Markets for agricultural products (output markets) can be viewed as an economic institution 
comprising organisation arrangements governed by a set of both formal rules and informal norms. The 
formal rules include in particular laws and other rules concerning both the protection of private 
property and the enforcement of contracts. In the area of agricultural commodities, specific other 
rules often apply, for example with respect to safety and quality standards. There may also be rules 
prescribing requirements or licensing of traders in such markets. Informal beliefs and norms mediating 
exchange in a market for agricultural products also characterise the nature and efficiency of the 
market mechanism. Similar to seeds, the amount and distribution of trust among actors is particularly 
important (sometimes this is the main concept implied by the use of the term, social capital; see for 
example Fafchamps and Minten62). 
 
Kherallah et al.63 classify the organisation of markets for food commodities in Africa into three types: 
relatively open; price intervention with limited parastatal involvement; and extensive involvement of 
parastatals in pricing, procurement, and food rationing. The development of more efficient markets for 
agricultural products can be seen as a process by which the institutional elements – both formal and 
informal – evolve in such a way that transactions costs are reduced. A reduction in transactions costs 
means that agricultural products can move from farm to consumer more efficiently, that is at lower 
cost, or mark-up (a smaller gap between consumer and producer prices). The mark-up is also due to 
transport and storage costs which can also be reduced, but research indicates that finding ways to 
economise on the transactions costs in general is the constraint to achieving economies of scale64 in 
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transport and storage62. In some situations, certain traders may not have an immediate economic 
interest in pursuing such efficiency gains, if this undermines their profits. 
 
Reducing transactions costs involved in the exchange of agricultural products is confronted by a 
number of technical challenges (aside from possible issues of political economy alluded to in the 
previous paragraph). One of the most important of these is the typically small scale of primary 
production on the farm, together with the high degree of variation in quality or other characteristics. 
The higher degree of variation means that traders have to inspect products at each transaction while 
the small scale of production means that there are more of these transactions, and thus inspections65. 
 
This situation is in fact a general one found in most agriculturally dominated economies. Economies of 
scale can be achieved by reducing the number and increasing the size of transactions, primarily at the 
farm end of the chain, but also by reducing the quality variation66. The process of increasing the size of 
transactions has involved the bringing together of farmers into organisations such as cooperatives or 
associations from which buyers then purchase the combined harvests of numerous farms. To some 
extent, this process involves a shifting of transactions costs from buyer to seller(s). But combined with 
a reduction in the variability of the product delivered, this can bring economic benefits for both parties. 
For example, groups of farmers working through an association can make commitments to deliver 
certain specified qualities (including specific characteristics) to buyers. Product variations are reduced 
by the use of new varieties of (commercial) seed that are relatively stable and uniform compared to 
traditional varieties (as discussed above). 
 
These types of developments that reduce transaction costs can generally be thought of as formal 
rules, including new ways of organising how things are done. But the viability of such formal rules and 
the effect they have depends also on informal norms and beliefs. Again, the development of trust (a 
form of social capital) among market participants has received the most attention here. Such trust is 
often manifested among social networks involving buyers and/or sellers which may be based on social 
ties such as family, tribe, or language. 
 
The importance of informal rules highlights an important point concerning the danger of trying to 
achieve such economies of scale through top-down or imposed initiatives to raise the scale of 
production, even if well-intended. Such schemes are likely to ignore important constraints on the 
behaviour of farmers or other market actors. 
 
Recent research on the development of market institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa has thus 
concentrated on the important role played by a number of institutional factors, both formal and 
informal: the development of trust, property rights, and improving the accessibility of players to 
information67. This has led to further research and even investments in experimenting with a range of 
strategies to address these issues, including establishing market information systems, grades and 
standards, commodity exchanges, and setting-up various arrangements (such as producer 
associations, cooperatives, or contract farming) that enhance the flow of information and also 
transactions between farmers and output markets (or their intermediaries)68 and reduce transaction 
costs. For the most part, these initiatives are limited by necessity to changes in formal rules governing 
both property rights and their transactions. But to some extent, the introduction of arrangements to 
link farmers and purchasers may contribute over time to changes in informal norms and beliefs, in 
particular the development of trust. 
 
In general the situation with vegetable crops is similar to that in staple commodities. Markets for 
vegetable crops are characterised by the same general features: large number of small transactions 
and varying quality. There is perhaps some degree of difference, particularly in the scale of 
production. Vegetables generally form a smaller share of food intake and are more costly (in terms of 
labour and other inputs such as water) to produce. In addition, the possibilities for storing more 
perishable products are limited. 
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The example of agricultural output markets illustrates the importance of institutions in understanding 
the process of economic development. The 1980s ushered in an era of unprecedented liberalisation of 
these markets in developing countries. The diverse results highlights that the seemingly simple aim of 
‘letting markets work’ tends to ignore the richness of the institutional fabric involved. To what extent 
and in what manner markets develop depends on the set of formal and informal institutional 
components that govern or condition exchange between buyers and sellers. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised some recent thinking on markets and the role of market institutions in 
agricultural development. Particular attention has been given to the relevance of this growing field of 
research to promoting agricultural development. So what does all this imply for the formulation of 
policy and interventions that aim to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth in the sector? 
 
One important issue concerns thinking about the broader definition of institutions employed here. In the 
early years of capacity development and institutional strengthening initiatives in development 
assistance programmes, attention concentrated primarily on enhancing the capacities of organisations 
– such as government ministries, public agencies, farmer associations and cooperatives – to carry out 
their formal tasks. The reasoning was essentially that these organisations were failing to perform these 
tasks sufficiently due to a lack of specific expertise among staff or physical resources. 
 
This focus was then expanded to recognise the wider institutional environment within which 
organisations operate. This led to attention for what has here been termed the institutional 
components in terms of formal rules, particularly legislation (and its implementation) and other 
regulations. Property rights, for example to land, are an example of a popular topic in institutional 
development. 
 
At roughly the same time, the withdrawal of direct government intervention in the organisation of 
agricultural input and output markets in many countries has been followed by a growing diversity of 
organisational forms and governance structures. The private sector (including foreign firms) has been 
the driver of these institutional innovations that attempt to coordinate various agricultural supply 
chains. Experiences in higher value horticultural products have received attention from policymakers, 
practitioners and researchers, with the growing role of supermarkets and concerns about exclusion of 
smallholder producers being recurrent themes. 
 
More recently, the role of informal institutions – summarised as norms and beliefs – has been 
recognised. From one perspective, evaluation of capacity development initiatives pointed towards the 
importance of the wider institutional environment in which organisations are embedded as critical for 
explaining success of failure of these initiatives. From another perspective, researchers have realised 
that the consequences of specific rules or organisational forms also depend on the wider cultural 
setting. Furthermore, these interactions have become a fast-growing area of systematic analysis. In 
particular, as seen in this chapter, the development of trust among individuals and within networks 
plays an important role as a basis of the functioning of organisations as well as more efficient market 
interactions. 
 
There has thus been a broadening of relevant issues in the field of institutional development. This does 
not mean that capacity development initiatives are less important, or that searching for improvements 
in laws and the legal system should receive less attention. The point is that in considering what types 
of strategies an ‘outsider’ can pursue, the range of options has become broader and more complex. 
The challenge is to find opportunities where all such elements can be combined. 
 
If changes in norms and beliefs are required in order for markets and production to become more 
efficient in given circumstances, this is clearly a daunting challenge. It can also possibly lead to 
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(renewed) charges of ‘cultural imperialism’. But the associated risks do not remove the need to 
address where the constraints actually lie. For example, what opportunities are there for introducing 
and promoting new forms of interaction among farmers and also with traders? What forms of 
interaction help the deepening of networks and the expansion of social capital so that risks are 
reduced and more productive exchange relationships are achieved? Some simple initiatives have 
illustrated the benefit from increased access to information for farmers. 
 
It has often been noted that efforts to strengthen the capacity of organisations require a long-term 
perspective and investment. It may be tempting to conclude that institutional change in the form of 
changes in informal beliefs and norms only lengthens this time horizon. While this may well be case, 
there may still be opportunities for faster gains. But the timeframes involved are still likely to be longer 
than the typical three, four or five-year assistance project. 
 
It is important to make one last point concerning institutions and technology, as this chapter has 
devoted most of its attention to the former. This focus should not be interpreted as meaning that a 
sufficient adjustment of institutions – including even beliefs (!) – can overcome all problems in 
agricultural development. Opportunities to produce and transform agricultural goods are also defined 
by technology and available resources (climate, land, labour, capital). This being said, there are clearly 
many situations where available technological possibilities are not being exploited. The message of this 
chapter is that even more attention is necessary to understand the economic, social and political (that 
is, institutional) reasons why this is so and to continue developing strategies to address them. 
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